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contribute after a terrorist attack, but the different options under which TRIA might be renewed carry
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OPTIONS FACING CONGRESS IN
RENEWING THE TERRORISM RISK
INSURANCE ACT (TRIA):
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
HOWARD KUNREUTHER
AND ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN
PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT
On July 17, 2014, the U.S. Senate passed
S. 22441, as amended, to extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) for seven
years. The House is also expected to bring
H.R. 48712, which reauthorizes TRIA for
five years with different provisions, to the
floor for a vote before the end of the summer. TRIA, a public-private partnership,
was established in 2002 when most insurers
and reinsurers stopped covering losses from
terrorism attacks after they paid claims of
$32 billion (2001 prices; $44 billion in 2014
prices; 2/3 of which was reinsured) from
the damage caused on September 11, 2001
(9/11 hereafter).
The claims from 9/11 dwarfed those
from previous terrorism-related property
losses. By comparison, the truck bomb

• In determining the future of TRIA in the
coming weeks and months, Congress
and the Administration will be making
important decisions on the nature of risksharing arrangements between the public
and private sectors.
• The authors perform an analysis of the
exposure of 764 insurers to terrorism risk
using the ratio of TRIA deductible over
surplus as a proxy, and indicate how
that exposure would change for different deductible levels.

detonated by Al Qaeda in the garage of the
North Tower of New York City’s World
Trade Center in February 1993 caused just
over $750 million in insured losses; the
bomb discharged by Timothy McVeigh
outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building
in downtown Oklahoma City in April 1995
resulted in damages totaling $650 million.
In the wake of the devastating coordinated attack by Al Qaeda on 9/11, most
insurers and reinsurers—faced with the
sudden realization that terrorist attacks
could be catastrophic—stopped offering
coverage for terrorism in the United States
unless required to do so. As a result, many
businesses operating in the U.S. found it
increasingly difficult to purchase commercial
property insurance that included the risk
of terrorism. Real estate and commercial
ventures stalled because of an inability to

• Using a terrorism risk model developed
in collaboration with the modeling firm
Risk Management Solutions, the authors
also analyze how economic losses under
different terrorist attack scenarios would
be shared among key stakeholders,
comparing the arrangements under the
current TRIA program to alternative terrorism risk insurance designs articulated
recently by the U.S. Senate and House.
• Renewing TRIA may limit the amount of
disaster relief the federal government
would contribute after a terrorist attack,
but the different options under which
TRIA might be renewed carry implications for how losses from any attack
would be spread between commercial
policyholders, insurers, and taxpayers.

obtain the requisite insurance protection. By
law, insurance companies offering workers’
compensation insurance cannot exclude the
peril of terrorism, nor can insurers exclude
terrorism from the “fire following” coverage in certain states. As a result, workers’
compensation insurance premiums increased
significantly after the 9/11 attack and many
carriers did not renew some of their policies
in major metropolitan areas.
Responding to these concerns, the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) was
enacted at the end of 2002 as a temporary
measure to increase the availability of coverage for terrorist acts. TRIA was designed to
achieve a balance of risk sharing between
the insurance industry, commercial policyholders and the federal government (taxpayers). TRIA requires that all U.S. insurance
companies offer terrorism coverage to
commercial firms—on the same terms and
conditions provided by their commercial
insurance policies for other perils—in
exchange for free up-front reinsurance from
the federal government against catastrophic
losses. Firms may be required to purchase
this coverage by state law. In fact, there was
a strong demand for coverage by commercial
firms due to lending requirements and/or
a desire to be protected against losses from
future attacks.3 TRIA was renewed for two
years in 2005, and again for seven years in
2007, with the private sector assuming more
of the risk with each extension of the program but with the federal government still
providing reinsurance against catastrophic
terrorist attacks at no charge. As a result of
TRIA’s passage, terrorism insurance is now
widely available and many businesses in the
United States have protected themselves
against these losses. Market analysis by two
large insurance brokers, Aon and Marsh,
indicates that on average 60% of their
clients (typically large firms) have purchased
terrorism insurance today. But insurers have
also indicated that they could not cover that
risk on their own, so a large private market
has not yet emerged.
1
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RISK-SHARING STRUCTURE
OF THE TRIA PARTNERSHIP
AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
We now contrast the current TRIA program
with the legislation proposed by the Senate
and House.

CURRENT DESIGN
Under TRIA’s current design, the costs
from “certified” terrorism events that result
in over $100 million (the program trigger)
in insured industry losses in TRIA-eligible
lines of business are shared as follows:
• Commercial policyholders are responsible
for paying any losses within their standard
5

insurance policy deductibles.
• Insurance companies then provide coverage for all losses in excess of these policy
deductibles, if total industry losses do not
exceed $100 billion.
• The federal government reinsures the
insurer’s terrorism loss in excess of a
TRIA deductible percent (D*) for losses
equal to 20% of that company’s prior
year’s direct earned premium (DEP) for
the lines covered under the program.
D* has increased from 1% in 2002 to 20%
since 2007.
• Losses in excess of each insurer’s deductible (D*) are shared 15/85 between the
insurers and the federal government. This
coinsurance arrangement was 10/90 when
TRIA was first passed.
• Should total insurance industry losses
exceed $100 billion, primary insurers are
responsible for reimbursing policyholders only for their proportionate share of
losses up to $100 billion, and Congress
shall determine the procedure and source
of any payments for the uninsured losses.
• The federal government recoups its payments under TRIA by levying surcharges
on all commercially insured policyholders
at a rate of 133% of its payments below
the insurance marketplace aggregate retention – an amount currently set at $27.5
billion – and above the aggregate insurers’
uncompensated outlays (i.e., insurer losses
within the deductible and coinsurance)
during the calendar year.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The Senate bill modifies the current program in several ways:
• Insurers’ coinsurance percentage on certified terrorism events would gradually
increase over 5 years from the current
15% to 20%.
• The marketplace aggregate retention
would increase from the current $27.5 billion by $2 billion annually until it reaches
$37.5 billion. 5
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To assist Congress and the Administration in their evaluation of renewal options
before the program expires at the end of
2014, this Issue Brief presents an analysis of how economic losses from terrorist
attacks would be shared among the different
stakeholders under the current TRIA program and the Senate and House alternative
designs. To do this, we examined three different terrorist attack scenarios in four large
cities located in different parts of the United
States: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles
and New York. Our analysis complements
recent publications on terrorism risk and
insurance, several Congressional hearings that took place in the House and the
Senate in 2012, 2013 and 2014, reports by
the President’s Working Group, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, the U.S.
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Services, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as insurance industry studies on take up rates and terrorism pricing
based on their portfolios of clients. A fuller
discussion of the findings summarized in
this brief can be found in the Wharton Risk
Center’s larger report, TRIA After 2014, 4
available free of charge on the website of the
Wharton Risk Center: http://www.wharton.
upenn.edu/riskcenter.

4

For purpose of our analysis we assume a $37.5 billion

The House bill differs from the Senate
bill in the following ways:
• It would increase the program trigger
from $100 million to $500 million.
• The marketplace aggregate retention
amount would now be calculated as the
sum of the deductible amounts of all
insurers participating in TRIA for the
year in which a terrorist attack occurs,
rather than a fixed amount (as an example,
this amount would be $32 billion for the
764 insurers we analyzed if based on 2012
market data).
• The percentage that the federal government recoups against all commercial
policyholders would increase from 133%
to 150% for losses subject to mandatory
recoupment.

AN ANALYSIS OF INSURERS’
DEDUCTIBLE/SURPLUS (D/S)
RATIOS
One measure of particular interest to insurers, regulators and rating agencies alike is
the ratio of the insurer’s TRIA deductible
amount in relation to its surplus. A higher
deductible/surplus (D/S) ratio implies that
the insurer is more exposed to losses from
a terrorist attack. While there is no specific
threshold that applies to all insurers given
their different portfolios, a D/S ratio greater
than 0.15 is generally regarded as a high
measure of relative exposure to terrorism.
Accessing market data from the rating
agency AM Best, we were able to determine
the D/S ratios of 764 insurance companies
operating in the United States and then
calculate changes in the D/S ratio for each
of the top 30, top 50, top 100, and top 450
insurers as the TRIA deductible percent
(D*) is varied from 15% (2005 level) to 20%
and 25%.
• Only 3 insurers among the top 30 would
have a D/S ratio of 0.15 or greater when
D*=15%; this increases to 7 insurers under
the current D*=20% and to 11 insurers
should D*=25% (see Table 1).
• For our sample of 450 insurers, when
D*=15%, 95 of them would have a D/S
ratio greater than 0.15; this would
increase to 140 insurers when D*=20%
and to 175 insurers if D*=25%.

Should D* be increased from its current 20% level, some insurers could face a
significant risk of insolvency or financial
distress after a severe terrorist attack if they
do not increase their levels of capital or
obtain private reinsurance in response to the
policy change.

QUANTIFYING LOSS SHARING
UNDER DIFFERENT TRIA
DESIGNS
We worked closely with modeling firm Risk
Management Solutions (RMS), which constructed the following three specific attack
mode scenarios based on their terrorism risk
model: (a) a 10-ton truck bomb; (b) 1-ton
Sarin gas release; and (c) 1-kiloton nuclear
detonation bomb. Key high-profile targets were identified in the central business
districts of the four major cities of Chicago,
Houston, Los Angeles and New York.
Using the 10-ton truck bomb scenario,
we undertake a series of analyses varying
four TRIA design parameters: (a) insurers’ deductibles; (b) level of coinsurance for
insurers; (c) insurance industry retention
level, to determine what part of the insured
losses paid by the federal government will
be mandatorily recouped against all commercial policyholders in the U.S.; and (d)
percentage of the federal payment that is
mandatorily recouped.

ASSUMPTIONS ON TERRORISM
INSURANCE MARKET SHARE AND
TAKE-UP RATES
We have utilized market shares of insurers
in individual states in which the four cities
are located to allocate losses from a terrorist
attack among the 764 largest insurers. These
firms account for virtually 100% of the terrorism insurance policies placed with U.S.
licensed primary insurance carriers at the
end of 2012. Property insurance lines have
been separated from workers’ compensation
lines.
As discussed earlier, terrorism cannot be
excluded from workers’ compensation insurance, which is required for all firms, so we
assume a 100% take-up rate for terrorismrelated workers’ compensation losses. Based
on studies by insurance brokers, we assume
a 50% take-up rate for terrorism insurance

for the property lines, recognizing that the
actual percentage may vary from one city to
another as well as by the type of firm.

KEY FINDINGS
Figures 1, 2 and 3 depict the distribution
of terrorism losses between noninsured firms, insurers, all commercial
policyholders (recoupment) and taxpayers
under the current TRIA program, and the
Senate and House bills respectively. In the
analysis below, we use the case of an attack
(10-ton truck bomb) in New York City.
The full report, TRIA After 2014, shows
the results from Chicago, Houston and
Los Angeles as well.
Based on TRIA’s current design,
our analysis reveals that under the
current loss-sharing arrangement, the
federal government (taxpayers) will not
be responsible for any payments after
mandatory recoupment until the losses
from a terrorist attack exceed $40 billion,
as shown in Figure 1.
Commercial policyholders will always
have to pay a portion of the cost of a terrorist attack under the current TRIA program
if the total loss to all industrial firms is less
than $80 billion, and they could end up paying as much as $11.3 billion. The significant
exposure of commercial policyholders has
not been widely discussed.
Based on the Senate bill, American
taxpayers would not be responsible for any
payments after mandatory recoupment by
the federal government until the total losses
from a terrorist attack (insured or not)
exceed $59 billion.
When damage reaches $100 billion,
the federal government will be responsible
for nearly $31 billion in payments, insurers
for $33 billion, commercial policyholders
for over $5.7 billion, and the remaining $30
billion would be uninsured.
Commercial policyholders could pay
more than $10 billion when total losses
from terrorist attacks are in the range of $38
billion to $82 billion, with a maximum of
$17.9 billion when total losses are $54 billion, as shown in Figure 2.

TABLE 1:

D/S ANALYSIS FOR THE TOP 30 INSURERS (2012 DATA)

Insurers

Surplus
(in $ billion)
		

Direct Earned Premiums
in TRIA Eligible Lines
(in $ billion)

20% TRIA
Deductible
(in $ billion)

D/S Ratio
(20% Deductible)

D/S Ratio
(25% Deductible)

1. Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies

$16.8

$12.0

$2.39

14.26%

17.82%

2. Travelers Group

$19.3

$10.9

$2.18

11.29%

14.12%

3. American International Group

$29.2

$10.4

$2.08

7.14%

8.93%

$7.7

$6.7

$1.35

17.57%

21.97%

5. Hartford Insurance Group

$14.2

$5.8

$1.17

8.22%

10.28%

6. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies

$13.8

$4.9

$0.98

7.10%

8.87%

7. CNA Insurance Companies

$10.0

$4.6

$0.92

9.23%

11.54%

8. Nationwide Group

$13.8

$4.5

$0.89

6.45%

8.06%

$5.7

$4.1

$0.82

14.41%

18.02%

$65.3

$3.1

$0.62

0.95%

1.19%

11. Allianz of America Companies

$3.6

$3.0

$0.61

16.93%

21.17%

12. FM Global Group

$7.5

$3.0

$0.60

7.99%

9.98%

13. W. R. Berkley Insurance Group

$4.7

$2.7

$0.54

11.64%

14.55%

14. Assurant P&C Group

$1.4

$2.7

$0.53

38.09%

47.61%

15. Farmers Insurance Group

$5.6

$2.6

$0.53

9.33%

11.66%

16. Philadelphia Ins Cos/Tokio Marine US

$4.2

$2.3

$0.46

11.00%

13.76%

17. QBE Americas Group

$2.3

$2.2

$0.44

19.08%

23.84%

18. Cincinnati Insurance Companies

$3.9

$2.1

$0.43

10.90%

13.63%

$106.7

$1.9

$0.38

0.35%

0.44%

20. Fairfax Financial (USA) Group

$5.2

$1.9

$0.38

7.24%

9.05%

21. NY State Insurance Fund WC Fund

$3.1

$1.9

$0.38

12.01%

15.01%

22. Old Republic Insurance Group

$2.8

$1.8

$0.35

12.77%

15.96%

23. Auto-Owners Insurance Group

$6.6

$1.7

$0.34

5.15%

6.43%

24. Great American P& C Insurance Group

$2.1

$1.6

$0.32

15.14%

18.93%

25. Hanover Insurance Group P&C

$1.5

$1.6

$0.31

20.63%

25.79%

26. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation

$6.3

$1.5

$0.30

4.79%

5.99%

$17.1

$1.2

$0.24

1.42%

1.77%

28. Munich-American Holding Corp

$5.9

$1.2

$0.24

4.06%

5.08%

29. Erie Insurance Group

$5.6

$1.1

$0.22

3.84%

4.80%

30. Selective Insurance Group

$1.0

$1.1

$0.21

20.10%

25.12%

4. Zurich Financial Services NA Group

9. ACE INA Group
10. State Farm Group

19. Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group

27. Allstate Insurance Group

FIGURE 1:

Based on the House bill, American
taxpayers would not be responsible for any
payments after mandatory recoupment by
the federal government until the total losses
from a terrorist attack (insured or not)
exceed $52 billion (Figure 3).
At a $100 billion loss, the insurers will
be responsible for the same $33 billion as
they would be under the Senate bill, but
the commercial policyholders will not pay
anything because the industry retention of
$32 billion is below the value of insurers’
payments. Hence, the government recoups
nothing from the policyholders and is left
paying the entire $36.84 billion.
Despite the higher 150% recoupment rate, commercial policyholders would
typically be less exposed to the mandatory
recoupment under the proposed House
legislation than the Senate bill. They could
pay more than $10 billion when losses from
terrorist attacks are between $36 to $59
billion, with a maximum of $15.3 billion
when losses are $46 billion, as shown in
Figure 3. We used $32 billion as market
retention in the above analysis based on
the sum of insurer deductibles for the 764
insurers we analyzed.
The actual mandatory recoupment
threshold may be higher than $32 billion
depending on actual market conditions at
the time of the attack and if other riskbearing entities, such as captives, had been
included in our study. For instance if one
considers market retention of $44 billion
(estimates by the Congressional Budget
Office for the year 2016) instead of $32
billion, then the House bill would be such
that American taxpayers would not be
responsible for any payments after mandatory recoupment by the federal government until the total losses from a terrorist
attack (insured or not) exceed $74 billion;
the maximum payment by the commercial
policyholders would then be much higher at
$26.8 billion.
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Insurer Payments

$50

Final Fed. Gov.
Taxpayers
$45

All Policyholders
Non-Insured

$40

$35

$30

$25

$20

$15

$10

$5

$0

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

Amount Paid ($ billion)

CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis assumes that firms suffering
losses from a terrorist attack will not receive
compensation from the federal government for the uninsured portion of their
loss. However, experience from 9/11, the
financial crisis and recent natural disasters
suggests that the government may assist
firms suffering uninsured losses, and the
amount of federal disaster relief is likely to
depend on the magnitude of the losses.
In analyzing each of these scenarios, we
have focused solely on the insurable losses
under the scenario and not the broader economic loss that would have to be addressed.
To the extent that a terrorist attack causes
indirect impacts, one needs to consider the

$60
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$80

$90
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Loss ($ billion)

role that insurance and other protective
measures undertaken by firms can play in
cushioning these longer-term economic
effects.
In the coming weeks and months,
Congress and the Administration will make
a decision about the future of TRIA after
2014 and the nature of the risk-sharing
arrangements between the private and
public sectors. Over the past decade, our
research team at the Wharton Risk Center
has published over 20 studies on terrorism
insurance markets based on discussions with
many of the key stakeholders interested in
these issues in the United States and abroad.
We hope the analysis in this brief helps to
inform decision makers.
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